overwhelmingly Asian.28
Eumenes arranged his army with his best troops stationed on the right. Here were the Argyraspids, Alexander’s former Hypaspists, who had decorated their shields with silver and hence the new name, and Eumenes’ own personal infantry guards, themselves numbering more than 3000.29 Given the numerical advantage that Antigonus possessed in heavy infantry, especially those equipped with the sarissa, the Argyraspids were on this occasion equipped with pikes,30 and Eumenes’ Hypaspists with hoplite spears. This flank was protected by 2,900 elite heavy cavalrymen, personally selected by Eumenes himself, including his 900 “companions,” his personal cavalry bodyguard, and all under the Cardian’s command. The entire phalanx was positioned behind a screen of elephants and light-armed troops, with the right cavalry wing screened by an additional corps of 40 elephants. On his left, Eumenes stationed 3,400 mostly light cavalry, anchored on the rising foothills, making any flanking maneuver by Antigonus’ forces difficult. In the infantry center, moving from left to right, were stationed 6,000 mercenaries armed as hoplites. Next came 5,000 “men of many races” armed with the sarissa. Following along the line were the Argyraspids, and then Eumenes’ infantry guards (Diod. Sic. 19. 27–29).
Antigonus, in response to Eumenes’ deployment, stationed approximately 7,000 light cavalry on his left flank under the command of Pithon. These included 1,000 mounted lancers and archers from Media and Parthia and 2,200 Tarentines,31 drawn up in open order and instructed to avoid any frontal attacks. They were to impede the progress of Eumenes’ best cavalry and elephants. Next to them were 12,000 hoplites, mercenaries, and Asian allies; and to their right, 16,000 sarissa-bearing infantry. The right flank was guarded by a few hundred light cavalry and 3,300 heavy cavalry, which, with the exception of 300 directly associated with Antigonus, were under the command of Antigonus’ 20-year-old son, Demetrius. Like Eumenes, Antigonus placed his phalanx behind a screen of elephants and kept another corps of the animals with him and his cavalry on his right. After some initial skirmishing, the screening elephants and the light-armed troops on both sides retreated through the ranks of their respective infantries, which then advanced to battle. Only the 40 elephants protecting Eumenes’ right flank apparently saw action and then only against the enemy’s light cavalry.
With their armies thus disposed, both forces advanced in an oblique fashion, with their right wings leading and their left held back, hoping that their respective right wings would crush the enemy’s left before their own left was destroyed. Consequently, Antigonus had told Pithon to attack Eumenes’ opposing cavalry immediately to slow its advance and give Antigonus’ right wing more time to win the battle. While Pithon’s troops initially caused great confusion on Eumenes’ right and inhibited this wing’s advance, Eumenes reinforced the harassed units with additional light cavalry from his left, with the result that Pithon and his forces were driven back to the foothills. Elsewhere Eumenes’ phalanx, even though inferior in numbers, proved superior in ability. Antigonus’ infantry was forced back to the hills as well. Antigonus now faced defeat, if not annihilation. But, by ignoring those who urged him to retreat, Antigonus saved himself and his army. As Eumenes’ phalanx pursued their beaten opponents, a gap opened in the line between the phalanx and the cavalry on Eumenes’ left. Antigonus with his heavy cavalry detachment charged through the break. With his left threatened, Eumenes recalled his victorious right. Antigonus now assembled his defeated forces and formed them up in a line along the foothills. Although it was already growing quite dark, both generals rallied their forces and prepared to renew the struggle. By midnight the two armies, after many attempts to outflank one another, formed into line about 3.5 miles from the site of the previous battle. By now, however, both armies were too exhausted to continue. In the battle Antigonus’ forces suffered the loss of 3,700 infantry and 54 cavalry, with 4,000 wounded. Eumenes’ troops lost 540 infantry and very few cavalry; his wounded amounted to 900. (These may be heavy infantry losses only, Diod. Sic. 19.30–31.) While Antigonus had lost more troops, the battle had ended in a stalemate. Subsequently, in the Battle of Gabene, Antigonus was able to effect the capture of Eumenes and thus end the Second War of the Successors. This victory was the result of a cavalry victory of sorts. During the actual battle part of Antigonus’ light cavalry had captured Eumenes’ camp, putting them in possession of the wives and possessions of the Argyraspids in particular. These troops, even though the result of the battle had been remarkably similar to that at Paraetacene, surrendered themselves and Eumenes to Antigonus (Diod. Sic. 19.43.8–9).
In time, cavalry diminished in importance and phalanxes increasingly became almost exclusively sarissa bearers, with pikes reaching as much as 24 feet in length (Polyaen. Strat. 2.29.2). These phalanxes were protected on the flanks by light-armed infantry and/or cavalry, whom they supplanted as the decisive component of the army. The lengthening of the pikes made this unit more invulnerable to a frontal attack, but even less maneuverable. Polybius describes the opposing phalanxes at Sellasia in 222 (2.65.1–7) and again at Mantinea in 207 (11.15.6, 16.1) as primarily armed with pikes. At Sellasia there were 14,000 sarissa carriers of whom 10,000 were Macedonian (Polyb. 2.65).32 In these battles many of the light infantry were armed, however, more heavily than the usual light-armed troops. These carried large oval shields and weaponry that varied from long thrusting spears to javelins. Troops so armed were known as Thureophoroi. If these troops were more heavily armored still, with a breastplate, they were called Thorakitai. While distinguishable from other light-armed soldiers, they were none the less to be included in their number. While Alexander the Great’s Hypaspists often accompanied light-armed troops, they also served regularly in the phalanx. The Thureophoroi and the Thorakitai appear not to be associated with the latter. They seem to have been a lighter version of traditional hoplites. In his description of the army of Antiochus III in 209, Polybius includes both the Thureophoroi and the Thorakitai with the light-armed troops (Polyb. 10.29.4–6). This distinction is also made in a battle near the Arcadian city of Caphyae in 219 at the beginning of the Social War. In this battle these troops were initially stationed on the wings, perhaps serving here as Philip’s and Alexander’s hoplite units did to protect the flanks of the phalanx (Polyb. 4.12.3, 12). However, unlike the Hypaspists, they clearly do not move in any type of formation (Plut. Phil. 9.1–2; Polyb. 4.12.7; Plut. Cras. 25.7).
Nowhere are these changes from the legacy of Philip and Alexander more apparent than in the decline in the quality of cavalry. This change in Hellenistic warfare was due to a combination of factors. One such factor was an effect of Philip’s initial reforms, which changed the dynamic of Macedonian society. His creation of a landed peasant class who peopled his infantry and his centralizing of power in royal authority both diminished the esprit de corps of the aristocratic class, not to mention their role as highly skilled mounted warriors. Alexander’s conquests only accelerated this process. While Alexander crossed to Asia with a ratio of infantry to cavalry of 6:1, the later Hellenistic period seldom saw a ratio of 10:1, and often even higher. In one of the few battles in the third century where cavalry played a significant role, Sellasia, this ratio in the victorious Antigonid army was still 23:1 (Polyb. 2.65.5; Liv. 34.28). Moreover, this was mostly light cavalry. The reduction in the numbers of heavy cavalry was even more dramatic in the Hellenistic kingdoms of Asia and northeast Africa. In Asia there was little tradition of heavy cavalry and in Egypt not much tradition of cavalry at all, apart from chariots. It apparently was not until the campaigns in central Asia of the Seleucid King Antiochus III that the Parthian “cataphracts” were introduced into Hellenistic warfare, but generally only served in the eastern Hellenistic armies. Whereas Philip and Alexander’s heavy cavalry, the Companions, wore armor and carried lances, with cataphracts, horse and rider were virtually encased in armor similar to that of Medieval knights (Liv. 35.48.3).33 However, even with these troops, cavalry in the Hellenistic era primarily skirmished with other cavalry. They were seldom employed against infantry. As noted, heavy cavalry was critical in Philip’s and Alexander’s battle plans. Cavalry now increasingly took on a secondary role, most units being light in weaponry and armament. After the deaths of Alexander’s immediate Successors, cavalry seldom won battles, which increasingly became confrontations between opposing pike phalanxes.
Later Battles: Raphia, Magnesia, and Pydna
Many