and fought as javelin men, slingers, or archers. Their formations were open as opposed to the dense, compact nature of the phalanx. The elite light infantry were the Agrianes, javelin men from a dependent ally centered in what is today Bulgaria. These were likely incorporated into Philip’s army and were used extensively by Alexander. They are often included in that commander’s flying columns where speed was paramount. Typically, battles began with attacks of slingers, archers, and javelin men, whose attacks from range were designed to disrupt the cohesiveness of the enemy infantry line. But they were also often used to shield the flanks and defend against enemy cavalry, and, in Asia in particular, against chariots and/or elephants. Alexander’s army that crossed to Asia included 7,000 additional light-armed troops. To these, as he penetrated deeper into Asia, were added additional light-armed auxiliaries from those areas brought under his domination. In 329, Alexander included a unit of 1,000 Iranian horse archers (hippotoxotai) in his grand army. These were used to great effect at the Battle on the Hydaspes against the chariots of the Indian prince Porus. Additionally, in this battle, Bactrian, Sogdianian, and Scythian cavalry were employed by Alexander (Arr. Anab. 5.12.2–3). Earlier, Persian scythed chariots at Gaugamela also proved ineffective. These chariots, outfitted with blades that extended from the wheel axle three feet on each side (Liv. 37.41.7–9), were met by Alexander’s Agrianians and other javelin men who disabled most of their drivers with their javelins. Those chariots that did make it through the barrage of javelins charged the Macedonian phalanx, which simply opened up avenues in their ranks through which the chariots passed harmlessly (Arr. Anab. 3.13.5–6).11 Later, in Babylon, Alexander incorporated both Iranian cavalry in traditional equipment and Persian infantry units. In 323, the Macedonian king received 20,000 Persian infantry and additionally units of Cossaeans and Tapurians (Arr. Anab. 7.23.1).
Chaeronea and Combined Arms
The battle that gave Philip hegemony in Greece, fought near the city of Chaeronea in 338, demonstrates the effectiveness of his new model army.12 Here his army numbered roughly 30,000 mostly Macedonian heavy infantrymen, 2,000 heavy Macedonian cavalry, known as the Companions, and an unknown number of light infantry and cavalry. Heavy cavalry typically wore breastplates, shoulder guards, and helmets; they also carried lances, often shortened versions of the infantry sarissa, and secondarily swords. Light cavalry were usually unarmored and equipped with bows or javelins. Philip faced a similarly sized combined Greek force consisting primarily of Athenian and Theban hoplites. The Athenians took up a position on the left wing opposite Philip and the Hypaspists, the Thebans the right, with other allies in the center. The Greek army was arranged in a defensive position, its left flank anchored by the rising foothills of Mount Thurium, the right resting against the Cephisus River. The foothills and the river bed were to be covered by light-armed infantry and light cavalry by both sides. The Greek line, about two miles in length, was consequently relatively secure on both flanks, leaving little room for the unopposed operation of enemy cavalry or light-armed troops, and thus seemingly negating Philip’s distinct advantage in cavalry. Facing this strong Greek defensive position, the Macedonian king decided on a complicated series of maneuvers to take advantage especially of the inexperienced Athenians. At first, he advanced his forces in echelon, with his right, as usual, under his personal command and containing the elite Hypaspists, here armed as hoplites13 and perhaps already 3,000 strong, to engage the Athenians before committing the Macedonian left against the more experienced Thebans. Given the nature of the battlefield and the size of the respective armies, the battle would be fought at least initially with full frontal infantry assaults. However, during the actual battle the integrity of the long infantry line was difficult to maintain. Terrain was uneven, injuries or deaths could cause gaps, simply someone tripping and falling could create problems. In the particular case of the Greek allies, the different contingents had not previously fought together and were assembled according to nationality. Forces so arranged would tend under pressure to gravitate toward their compatriots, which could cause gaps in the line. Given that the flanks were well guarded, Philip’s goal was to enable his son Alexander, who commanded on the left with the Companion Cavalry, to penetrate the Greek line.14 Whatever opposition cavalry appeared would be easily overcome by the superior forces under Alexander’s command. To accomplish the goal of penetrating the Greek line, Philip planned, after initial contact with the Athenians, for the Macedonian right, at Philip’s command, to begin a slow withdrawal up some rising ground near the foothills of the nearby mountain. This would stretch the Greek line, as the Athenians attempted to overwhelm their opponents (Polyaen. 4.2.2, 7).
The Athenians finding the enemies before them giving ground began what was apparently an over-enthusiastic and disordered advance. With the Athenians attacking wildly to their left and the Boeotian right maintaining its position along the riverbed, as Philip had planned, the allied center began to separate as these troops found themselves pulled between the Athenians moving to the left and the Boeotians standing firm on the right. For a time the battle was a struggle of competing infantries all along the line, but under the continuous probing of the Macedonian pikes, a gap or thinning in the line appeared through which Alexander and the cavalry charged, turning to attack the exposed Theban flank.15 Without stirrups, heavy cavalry could only attack infantry under special circumstances—when they fled, when gaps or thinning occurred in their line, or in assaults on the vulnerable flanks or rear. Here, direct assault would be possible, especially when charging in a wedge formation. Under these circumstances the momentum of the group served both to keep the pack in formation and to hit the line with tremendous force. The dangers in such an operation were great. If one horse in the front went down, it could lead to a cascading event. Also, if the infantry line was not broken by the initial charge, the cavalry was likely to be surrounded and overwhelmed by the opposing infantry.
After Alexander’s breakthrough, the Theban right wing, including the famous Sacred Band, found themselves fully engaged frontally by their Macedonian heavy infantry counterparts, and attacked simultaneously on their left and rear by the Macedonian Companion Cavalry. On the Macedonian right, Philip, having withdrawn to higher ground, stopped his feigned retreat and charged, breaking the spirit and coordination of the Athenian phalanx. With the Athenians in full flight, Philip’s right pivoted and attacked the allied line, which now broke and fled. The result was a crushing defeat for Philip’s enemies. A thousand Athenians lay dead, with 2,000 captured (Diod. Sic. 16.86.5–6). While numbers are not given for the Theban, Boeotian, and other allied dead, the totals were probably equally high, and the famous Sacred Band had been destroyed (Plut. Pel. 18.5).
While the core of the Macedonian infantry was composed of those bearing pikes (sarissai), as noted, modified hoplite armament was an important component of both Philip’s and Alexander’s Macedonian infantry. The troops were more flexible than the traditional sarissa bearers, even though, under the tutelage of Philip and Alexander, sarissa-bearing units were capable of moving quickly into varying formations, square, wedge, column, etc. but they required level and clear ground with no obstacles (Polyb. 18.31.5–6) and were ineffective in small units or as single soldiers (Polyb.18.32.9; cf. 11.15.7–16.3).16 Sarissai were weapons designed exclusively for the battlefield and in close array. As with broken ground, anything that could create gaps in the formation could spell disaster. Crossing broken terrain could also destroy a phalanx’s cohesion. At the Battle of Mantinea, a small ditch was sufficient to result in the defeat of the Spartan pikemen (Polyb. 11.15.7–16.2), and at Pydna in 168, while the Roman commander described how the Macedonian phalanx filled him with fear and amazement, that general drew it onto broken ground where it was annihilated (Plut. Aem. 19.1–3). In instances where roads were difficult or where speed was essential, “lighter-armed” heavy infantry would be used. Most importantly the sarissa phalanx was not very flexible. As Nicholas Hammond states, “[the sarissa] was unsuitable for skirmishing, besieging, street-fighting, ambushing, [and] mountaineering.”17 Despite Aristotle’s belief that “hoplites are useless without orderly formation” (Arist. Pol. 4.1297B), and even though they were most effective in, and designed for, warfare in the compact phalanx, hoplites were capable of individual combat especially against opposing troops in disarray when the cohesion of the enemy infantry collapsed, or in general against Asiatic heavy infantry forces that tended to wear less