legionnaires charged in. Panic now seized the Seleucid forces and most of the survivors of the battle surrendered. The battle ended in a complete Roman victory (App. Syr. 6.34–35; Liv. 37.42).
At Pydna, the Macedonian army met the Romans in the climactic engagement that saw the true end of Macedonian independence.53 In this conflict the Romans had fewer than 43,000 foot (cf. Plut. Aem. 16.4; Liv. 44.38.5), of whom 26,000 were heavy infantry (Liv. 44.21); the Macedonians had 39,000 infantry (Liv. 42.51.10), approximately 20,000 weilding pikes.54 The cavalry forces were roughly equal, about 4,000 each (Liv. 42. 51.10). The site was a plain very suitable for the phalanx, with nearby hills that gave the skirmishers and light-armed troops opportunity for retreat and flank attacks (Plut. Aem. 16.5). The Romans occupied the center of their infantry line with the allied Latin, Italian, and Greek infantry on their flanks. The cavalry was placed on the wings, with the Roman right being supplemented by 22 elephants. The pikemen took up the center of the Macedonian line, with the elite 3,000-strong “peltasts” forming the left of the phalanx. Lighter infantry guarded both flanks, where the Macedonian cavalry were also arrayed (Frontin. Str. 3.20). The stronger contingent was on the Macedonian right, where Perseus commanded the heavy cavalry. The battle began with the advance of the Macedonian phalanx, which initially pushed back first the Roman skirmishers and then the legions. As the phalanx advanced it passed onto broken ground and gaps began to appear in the once solid pike line.55 Into these, the Romans rushed. On the Roman right flank, the elephants proved most effective, crushing the Macedonian left. The Macedonian elephants proved of no use whatever. The Roman contingents of light-armed troops and cavalry followed up the charge of the elephants and drove off the Macedonian left wing. Once the compact nature of the phalanx was broken and attacked on its flank and rear, it became virtually useless. Sarissai were never designed for close-in combat and the pikemen themselves wore insufficient armor. The 3000-man royal infantry guard fought to the death, and the Macedonians are reported to have suffered more than 20,000 dead or captured. The high casualties were the result of the flight of the Macedonian cavalry, most of the victims falling during the pursuit (Liv. 44.41; Plut. Aem. 18–19).
Polybius, the second-century historian, compared the phalanx to the Roman legion, and while he declared that “it is impossible to resist the charge of the phalanx, so long as it retains its proper formation and strength,” he still conceded the superiority of the legion (18.29–32). He points to the inability of the phalanx to operate effectively on broken ground, but more importantly the legion’s greater flexibility and the individual legionnaire’s ability to operate singly or in a small group. While these are valid criticisms, it may not be fair to speak of Hellenistic weaknesses, when, in truth, the defeat of these Hellenistic armies was to a great degree the result of other Roman strengths. The phalanx was not initially created to win battles, but to create conditions so that the superior Macedonian heavy cavalry could probe an enemy’s infantry for weaknesses that could then be exploited to victory. This superior Macedonian cavalry did not exist in the second century. Cavalry was still effective in this period, but not in the same way as it had been, especially in the time of Alexander. In these last two battles, cavalry was indeed very effective, but unfortunately for the Macedonians and the Seleucids it was effectively used primarily by their opponents. Furthermore, while Roman forces represented the combined resources of a united Italy, what had been Alexander’s great empire had fragmented into three main kingdoms with a number of lesser states in Asia and various federations of cities in Greece. The original resources and strengths of Philip’s and Alexander’s armies were now dissipated throughout these various states and federations. Moreover, these forces never united against the threat coming from the West. Most of the time the Romans, as at Magnesia and Pydna, were allied with other Hellenistic entities against some Hellenistic state. In the case of Magnesia, it was the king of Pergamum who was critical to the Roman victory. Roman military strength was certainly supplemented by clever diplomacy. The Romans regularly intervened in Hellenic affairs, claiming to be “freeing the Greeks” from the grasp of this or that Hellenistic state. In the final analysis, it could be said that the Romans freed the Greeks right into the Roman Empire.
Notes
1 1 Anson 2013, 24–25. See also Carlier 2000.
2 2 Anson 2008b, 17–30.
3 3 Theophrastus (Hist. Pl. 3.12.2) gives the length of the longest Macedonian sarissa as 18 feet and Asclepiodotus (Tact. 5.1) confirms by stating that the shortest Macedonian pike was 15 feet and that the longest was not more than 18 feet. These different lengths may be the result of using longer sarassai in later ranks so as to extend the number of spear points that protruded before the front rank (Asclepiod. Tact. 5.2). Arrian (Tact. 12.7) gives the length of the sarissa as 16 feet.
4 4 Machiavelli 1965, 47.
5 5 Anson 2010b.
6 6 Anson 2010b, 65–66.
7 7 Markle 1978, 491–492; Anson 1985a, 247–248; Anson 2010a, 63 and n. 88; Anson 2013, 50.
8 8 Anson 2010a, 81–90.
9 9 Worley 1994, 157.
10 10 Later during the Antigonid dynasty of Macedonian rulers, peltast came to refer to the heavy infantry, pike bearers, of the phalanx. The change in definition in Macedonia came from the pelta, the small round shields carried by the members of the phalanx (Juhel and Sekunda 2009, 107).
11 11 See, however, Heckel, Willekes, and Wrightson 2010.
12 12 On the battle see Diod. Sic. 16.86; Polyaen. 4.2.2, 7; Frontin. Strat. 2.1.9; cf. Plut. Alex. 9.2; Arr. Tact. 16.6–7.
13 13 Markle 1977, 323, 329; Heckel and Ryan 2006, 63–64; Anson 2010a, 82.
14 14 Markle 1978, 490–491; Anson 2017.
15 15 See Worley 1994, 160; Willekes 2013, 300 with n. 496, 319.
16 16 In the contest in 326/325 between the Athenian wrestler armed with only a club and wearing no body armor and the Macedonian phalangite fully equipped, the latter proved no match for the former (Diod. Sic. 17.100.2–101.2, Curt. 9.7.16–23).
17 17 Hammond, 1980a, 53.
18 18 While this is the estimate found in most modern accounts, Bosworth (1988, 57) is correct that “it is impossible to give even an educated guess.”
19 19 Arr. Anab. 2.10.3; Diod. Sic. 17.33.5, 34.2.
20 20 Diod. Sic. 19.42.3, 43.8–9; Polyaen. 4.6.13; Plut. Eum. 16.10–11, 17.2–4; Just. 14.3.3, 12.
21 21 See also Chapter 15 in this volume.
22 22 Recently Charles 2008, 9.
23 23 Kistler 2007, 20.
24 24 For a discussion of the controversial chronology, see Anson 2014, 116–121.
25 25 See Anson 2015, 191 n. 73.
26 26 See Anson 2015, 191 n. 74.
27 27 Anson 2015, 191.
28 28 Olbrycht 2013, 159–178.
29 29 Anson 1988, 131–133.
30 30 In the later Battle of Gabene, the Argyraspids overwhelmed Antigonus’ phalanx and, when subsequently exposed to cavalry attack, were able to form a square and successfully retreat (Diod. Sic. 19.43.1, 4–5). Unlikethe Spartan experience at the Battle of Lechaeum in 391 where an unsupported hoplite regiment was attacked by light-armed troops and 250 of them were killed (Xen. Hell. 4.5.13–18), a pike-bearing phalanx during the Battle of Magnesia in 190 faced with similar circumstances formed a square and the long pikes deflected the projectiles and kept the phalangites reasonably safe (App. Syr. 6.35).
31 31 These were perhaps originally associated with the city of Tarentum, but over time the term came to be applied generally to any javelin-armed cavalrymen.
32 32 The 3,000 Achaeans are described as “picked.” Moreover, Polybius (2.65.2) records the presence of peltasts, Agrianians, and Gauls, which suggests that Polybius is being precise in his differentiation.
33 33