drawback of the alternative world: knowing who was who would be a rather more difficult matter than in the actual world. However, that problem could be dealt with by variants on the above scenario. One variant, for example, would involve having identity of genetic makeup except with regard to the genes that determine the appearance of one’s face and hair. Then one could identify individuals in the way one typically does in the actual world.
Given that change, the alternative world would not be one where, gender aside, individuals would be identical with respect to genetic makeup. Nevertheless, if this other alternative world would be preferable to the actual world, I think that it still provides an argument against the claim that individuals have a right to a unique genetic makeup. For, first of all, the preferability of this other alternative world strongly suggests that genetic difference, rather than being desirable in itself, is valuable only to the extent that it is needed to facilitate the easy identification of people. Secondly, is it plausible to hold that while genetic uniqueness is crucial, an extremely high degree of genetic similarity would not be troubling? For in the alternative world in question, the degree of genetic similarity between any two individuals would be extraordinarily high. Thirdly, the alternative world is one where the initial structure of one's brain is absolutely the same in all individuals. But, then, can one plausibly hold that genetic uniqueness is morally crucial, while conceding that a world in which individuals do not differ from one another with regard to the initial nature of their brains might be better than the actual world? That seems to me implausible.
The upshot is that I think that the three ways mentioned in which the alternative world would be better than the actual world are good grounds for concluding that, all things considered, the alternative world would be better than the actual world. If so, there is good reason to reject the view that genetic uniqueness is morally significant.
3.1.2 The “Open Future” Argument
Brock mentions a second argument for the view that cloning aimed at producing persons is intrinsically wrong (1998, 153–4). The argument is based upon ideas put forward by Joel Feinberg, who speaks of a right to an open future (1980), and by Hans Jonas, who refers to a right to ignorance of a certain sort (1974) – an idea that has since been enthusiastically endorsed by George Annas (1998, 124) – and the argument is essentially as follows. One's genetic makeup may very well determine to some extent what possibilities are open to one, and thus may constrain the future course of one's life. If no one else has the same genetic makeup, or if someone does, but either one is unaware of that, or else that person is one's contemporary, or someone who is younger, then one will be unable to observe the previous course of the life of someone with the same genetic makeup as oneself. But what if one knows of a genetically identical person whose life precedes one's own? Then one could have knowledge that one might well view as showing that certain possibilities were not really open to one, so one would have less of a sense of being able to choose the course of one's life.
To evaluate this argument, one needs to consider what type of conclusion one might draw as a result of observing the earlier life of someone with the same genetic makeup as oneself. Suppose that one had observed someone striving very hard, over a long stretch of time, to achieve some goal and failing to get anywhere near it. Perhaps the earlier, genetically identical individual wanted to be the first person to run the marathon in under two hours, and after several years of intense and well‐designed training, attention to diet, etc., never got below two and a half hours. Surely one would then be justified in viewing that particular goal as not really open to one. But would that knowledge be a bad thing, as Jonas seems to be suggesting? Would not such knowledge, on the contrary, be valuable, by making it easier to choose goals that one could successfully pursue?
A very different possibility is that, observing the life of the genetically identical individual, one concludes that no life significantly different from that life could really be open to one. Then one would certainly feel that one's life was constrained to a very unwelcome extent. That conclusion, however, would be one that is unsupported by the evidence; indeed, one that there is excellent evidence against.
First of all, although identical twins can be very similar in some striking ways, they can also have lives that are quite different. Secondly, as Pinker points out (1997, 35), one’s genes do not contain sufficient information to fix the wiring in one’s brain, and the differences may be very important with regard to the traits one develops. Thirdly, as was noted earlier, it is a well‐established scientific fact that the traits of identical twins display a correlation of only about 50%, so the scope for a different life is very significant – even more so with clones than with identical twins, given that a clone develops inside a different womb, and then is raised by a different family, and belongs to a different peer group. The belief that the course of a clone’s life would be seriously constrained is, therefore, not a defensible belief.
In conclusion, then, it seems that this second argument for the view that cloning with the goal of producing persons is intrinsically wrong is unsound.
3.1.3 Causing psychological distress
This objection is closely related to the two preceding, violation‐of‐rights objections, as the idea is that, even if cloning does not violate a person's right to be a unique individual, or to have a unique genetic makeup, or to have an open and unconstrained future, nevertheless, people who are clones may feel that their uniqueness is compromised, or that their future is constrained, and this may cause substantial psychological harm.
There is, however, a good reason for viewing this objection as unsound. It emerges once one reflects upon the beliefs in question – namely, the belief that one's uniqueness is compromised by the existence of a clone, or the belief that one's future is constrained if one has knowledge of the existence of a clone. Both beliefs are, as we have seen, false. In addition, however, it also seems plausible that those beliefs would be, in general, irrational, since it is hard to see what grounds one could have for accepting either belief, other than something like genetic determinism – against which, as we have seen, there is conclusive evidence. If, however, the psychological distress would necessarily be due to irrational beliefs, the solution is readily at hand: if cloning that produces persons were allowed, society would need to act to ensure that cloned individuals did not acquire an irrational belief in genetic determinism, thereby preventing the distress that might otherwise arise from a false and irrational belief.
Notice, too, what would happen if cloning became a familiar occurrence, and suppose that society had somehow failed to ensure that John, who is a clone, did not acquire the false beliefs in question, and that John has come to feel that he is no longer a unique individual, or that his future is constrained. If Mary is also a clone, she may point out to John that she is different from the person with whom she is genetically identical, and that she has not been constrained by the way the other person lived her life. Would John still persist in his irrational belief? That does not seem likely. Accordingly, distress that might arise in such a case seems unlikely to persist for any significant length of time.
3.1.4 Failing to treat individuals as ends in themselves
A fourth objection applies, not to the cloning of persons in general, but to certain cases – such as where parents clone a child who is suffering from some life‐threatening condition in order to produce another child who can save the first child's life – and the contention is that such cases involve a failure to treat individuals as ends in themselves. Thus Philip Kitcher, referring to such cases, says that “a lingering concern remains,” and he goes on to ask whether such scenarios “can be reconciled with Kant's injunction to 'treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means’” (1997, 61).
What is one to say about this objection? In thinking about it, it seems important to specify what sacrifices the child being produced will have to make to save his or her sibling. Kitcher, in his formulation, assumes that it will be a kidney transplant, which is a very significant sacrifice indeed, since it may have unhappy