very significant contributions to science, the idea does not seem especially plausible. In the first place, whether an individual will turn out to do highly creative work, rather than being determined simply by his or her genetic makeup, surely depends upon traits whose acquisition is a matter either of the environment in which the individual grows up, or, alternatively, in view of Pinker’s point, of the prenatal wiring of that person’s brain.
Could it not be argued in response, however – at least if one sets aside the second of those possibilities – that one could control the environment as well, raising a clone of Einstein, for example, in an environment as similar as possible to that in which Einstein was raised? That, of course, might prove difficult. Even if it could be done, however, it is not clear that would be sufficient, since great creative achievements may depend upon things that are to some extent accidental, and whose occurrence is not ensured by the combination of one’s genetic makeup, the prenatal wiring of one’s brain, and the general kind of environment in which one grows up. Many great mathematicians, for example, have developed an intense interest in numbers at an early age, and even if one leaves aside the prenatal brain‐wiring view, is there good reason to think that, had one been able to clone Carl Friedrich Gauss, and reared that person in an environment similar to Gauss's, that person would have developed a similar interest in numbers, and gone on to achieve great things in mathematics? Or is it likely that a clone of Einstein, raised in an environment similar to Einstein’s, would have wondered, as Einstein did, how the world would appear if one could travel as fast as light, and would then have pondered the questions that fascinated Einstein, and that led ultimately to the development of revolutionary theories in physics?
I am inclined to think, then, that there are problems with the present suggestion in the form in which it is usually put. On the other hand, I'm not convinced that a slightly more modest version cannot be sustained. Consider, for example, the chess‐playing Polgár sisters, where the father of three girls succeeded in creating an environment in which all three of his daughters became very strong chess players, with one of them – Judit Polgár – becoming the strongest female chess player who has ever lived. Is it not reasonable to think that if one were to make a number of clones of Judit Polgár, and then raised them in an environment very similar to that in which the Polgár sisters were raised, the result would be a number of very strong chess players?
More generally, there is strong evidence of a very significant hereditary basis for intelligence, as Bouchard (1997, 55–6) and many others have argued, and it may well be that the right combination of heredity and environment plays a significant role in the development of other traits that may play a crucial role in creativity – traits such as extreme persistence, determination, and confidence in one's own abilities. So while the chance that the clone of an outstandingly creative individual will also achieve very great things is perhaps, at least in many areas, not especially high, I think that there is reason for thinking that, given an appropriate environment, the result in a number of areas may well turn out to be an individual who is likely to accomplish things that may benefit society in significant ways.
3.3.8 furthering scientific knowledge: Psychology, the causes of traits of character, and the rearing of children
A crucial theoretical task for psychology is the construction of a satisfactory theory to explain the acquisition of traits of character, and central to the development of such a theory is information about the extent to which various traits are (a) inherited, (b) dependent upon aspects of the environment that are controllable, or (c) dependent upon factors, either in the brain, or in the environment, that have a chancy quality. Such knowledge, however, is not just theoretically crucial to psychology. Knowledge of the contributions that are, and are not, made to the individual's development by his or her genetic makeup, by the prenatal state of the individual’s brain, by the environment in which he or she matures, and by chance events, will enable one to develop approaches to childrearing that will increase, at least to some extent, the likelihood that one can raise children with desirable traits, and thus people who will have a better chance of realizing their potentials, and of leading happy and satisfying lives. So this knowledge is not merely of great theoretical interest: it is also potentially very beneficial to society.
In the attempt to construct an adequate theory of human development, one thing that has been very important, and that has generated considerable information concerning the nature/nurture issue, is the study of identical twins. Complete and fully adequate theories, however, still seem rather remote. Cloning would provide a powerful way of speeding up scientific progress in this area, since society could produce a number of individuals with the same genetic makeup, and then choose adoptive parents who would provide those individuals with good, but significantly different environments, in which to mature. The resulting scientific knowledge, in turn, would hopefully sweep away, in the end, advice of the kinds that are currently being offered to parents – almost all of which, as Judith Rich Harris has convincingly argued (2009, 309–29) – rests on claims against which there is very strong scientific evidence. With that rubbish gone, parents could be provided with scientifically based information about what they can and cannot hope to achieve in rearing children, and about what things are most likely to be helpful.
Conclusion
I have argued both that there are no sound objections to cloning for scientific research or therapeutic purposes, or to the creation of human organ banks, and also that the cloning of persons is both desirable in various ways and, in principle, morally unproblematic.
References
1 Annas, George J. (1998). “Why We Should Ban Human Cloning,” The New England Journal of Medicine, July 9, 1998.
2 Bouchard, Thomas J., Jr. ( 1997). “Whenever the Twain Shall Meet,” The Sciences 37/5, September/October 1997, 52–7.
3 Brock, Dan W. (1998). “Cloning Human Beings: An Assessment of the Ethical Issues Pro and Con.” In Martha C. Nussbaum and Cass R. Sunstein (eds.), Clones and Clones, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
4 Cerva, R. P. and Stojkovic, M. (2007). “Human embryonic stem cell derivation and nuclear transfer: impact on regenerative therapeutics and drug discovery,” Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics, 82/3, 310–15.
5 Eisenberg Leon (1976). “The Outcome as Cause: Predestination and Human Cloning,” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 1, 318–31.
6 Feinberg, Joel (1980). “The Child's Right to an Open Future.” In W. Aiken and H. LaFollette, Whose Child? Children's Rights, Parental Authority, and State Power, Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Littlefield.
7 Gallop Poll (2019). “Gay and Lesbian Rights”, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay‐lesbian‐rights.aspx (Accessed January 24, 2020.)
8 GLAPN (2007). “History of Sodomy Laws,” http://www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/history/history.htm (Accessed September 17, 2020).
9 Grogan, David (1990). “To Save Their Daughter from Leukemia, Abe and Mary Ayala Conceived a Plan‐and a Baby, People, March 5, 1990. https://people.com/archive/to‐save‐their‐daughter‐from‐leukemia‐abe‐and‐mary‐ayala‐conceived‐a‐plan‐and‐a‐baby‐vol‐33‐no‐9/ (Accessed January 24, 2020.)
10 Harris, Judith Rich (1998). The Nurture Assumption, New York: Free Press.
11 Hart, Ronald, Angelo Turturro, and Julian Leakey, ( 1997). “Born Again?” The Sciences 37/5, September/October 1997, 47–51.
12 Jonas, Hans (1974). Philosophical Essay: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice‐Hall.
13 Kaczor, Christopher (2014). The Ethics of Abortion – Women’s Rights, Human Life, and