both in recruitment and in finding equipment, damaging to both Territorials and New Armies. When voluntary direct enlistment in the Territorial Force ceased in December 1915, some 725 842 men had enlisted in it, or approximately half the number enlisted in the New Armies in the same period.
Unfortunately, too, the raising of the New Armies was almost entirely random: there was no coherent manpower policy until December 1917. Kitchener had no clear idea of how many men might be needed, and never articulated how he had discerned that the war would last at least three years. On 6 August 1914 Parliament was asked to sanction an immediate increase of 500 000 men, Kitchener making his appeal for the «first 100 000» on 7 August. A figure of 70 divisions is usually cited as the ultimate intention but this was not adopted until August 1915, Kitchener having spoken of 30 divisions on 31 August 1914, 46 to 50 on 8 September 1914, and 60 in June 1915. The official figure was adjusted downwards to 62 divisions abroad and five at home in February 1916, and then to 57 abroad and 10 at home in April 1916. In terms of overall numbers, Parliament sanctioned a further 500 000 increase on 9 September 1914, another million on 12 November 1914, and an upper limit of four million men in December 1915. The figure was adjusted retrospectively to five million in December 1916.
What has been characterised as the «rush to the colours» in 1914 was quite arbitrary, and the impact accordingly varied. 15 per cent of all wartime enlistments did indeed take place in the first two months of the war but the response was not immediate. It has been almost precisely dated to the period between 25 August and 9 September 1914. Initial confusion was not assisted by a lack of news from France until the publication in The Times on 30 August of the sensational «Amiens despatch» reporting the retreat from Mons. German atrocity stories had also surfaced and on 24 August the highly influential Lord Derby approached the War Office with a suggestion to raise «Pals» battalions of men from the same communities and factories.
Together, these factors accounted for the great increase. Only 51 647 men had enlisted in Britain prior to 15 August 1914, but 174 901 were enlisted between 30 August and 5 September. A total of 179 680 men enlisted in the first week of September, with the 33 204 who enlisted on 3 September the highest recorded for any single day, exceeding a year’s pre-war enlistment rate. The most fruitful recruiting period was over by 9 September as the news from France improved, and there were rumours that recruits were suffering discomfort in improvised accommodation. It appeared that men were no longer required, deferred enlistment having been introduced in view of the accommodation problems with men enlisted in the reserve and sent home. The War Office also tried to regulate the flow on 11 September by arbitrary variations in physical requirements.
Enlistment was exceedingly complex with wide regional and local variations. By November 1914, it was reported that, while southern Scotland had produced 237 recruits per 10 000 of population, the Midlands 196 per 10 000, Lancashire 178 per 10 000, London and the Home Counties 170 per 10 000, and Yorkshire and the North East 150 per 10 000, the South West had found only 88 per 10 000, and East Anglia only 80 recruits per 10 000.6
Patriotism played its part but other factors were equally important. One was family situation. War Office inefficiency in paying out adequate separation allowances discouraged married men. Others with dependants also took time to put domestic affairs in order. There was a particular link with employment, possibly as many as 480 000 men losing their jobs by the end of August 1914. Many others were placed on half time in the prevailing economic uncertainty at the outbreak of war. In Bristol, for example, 10 per cent of the work force was laid off in July 1914, and a further 26 per cent placed on short time. In August, the Local Government Board instructed charities to refuse relief to those eligible for enlistment. Nine out of every ten men laid off in the city enlisted, and Bristol’s unemployment fell by a full 1,5 per cent.
Significantly, enlistment dropped away rapidly once large government contracts were placed in the autumn for clothing, boots, munitions and other war essentials.
In the case of the South West, the abundance of the 1914 harvest, with small farming owner-occupiers prepared to offer incentives to labourers to remain on the land, contributed to significantly low rates of enlistment compared to the national average. In Cornwall, while extraction industries such as china clay and tin were suffering economic depression from falling prices, the labour force was used to economic cycles of boom and slump, and men appeared prepared to await better times rather than enlisting.7 In Scotland, it has been suggested that enlistment might be seen as a continuation of pre-war emigration.8
As might be expected, as young men tended generally to enlist before older men there was a direct correlation between average age and enlistment. From the beginning, there was also a degree of protectionism for key workers such as railwaymen and Admiralty employees who were «badged» with war service badges from December. Others enlisted under peer influence, joining because their friends had done so. The most obvious manifestation was the success of the «Pals» battalions, of which 115 were raised including the «Accrington Pals», Glasgow Corporation Tramways Battalion, «Grimsby Chums», and «Newcastle Commercials». Some reasons why men enlisted simply defy categorisation. Some may simply have enlisted on impulse. Sidney Rogerson of the 2nd West Yorkshire Regiment recalled his batman enlisted in an alcoholic haze after seeing a friend off to the front, but never recalled doing so, and «‹when the sergeant comes and claimed› him next morning he was as surprised as his wife was annoyed».9
A short war was anticipated. The reality was not only massive casualties, but also competing demands for manpower between the armed forces, industry and agriculture, as the conflict became one in which it was just as vital to out-produce as to out-fight the enemy. The manpower pool rapidly declined, with ever more desperate efforts to comb out every possible fighting man. The effective limit of volunteers was reached by December 1915, by which time it was clear that conscription must follow through a process of exhaustion. But conscription had long been an anathema in Britain. There was a long and agonised debate, the organisational milestones being the Householders’ Returns in November and December 1914, the National Register in July 1915, and the Derby Scheme of October to December 1915. The results of the latter finally forced Prime Minister Asquith’s hands. The «Bachelor’s Bill» in January 1916 deemed all single men and childless widowers between the ages of 18 and 41 to have enlisted. The wide discrepancies in medical examination and the numerous exemptions granted by military service tribunals resulted in fewer recruits than anticipated. Consequently, conscription was extended to all men aged between 18 and 41 in May 1916. Further extensions saw the combing out of more men, including many previously judged unfit, in April 1917; the conscription of allied citizens living in Britain in July 1917; and removal of yet further occupational exemptions in February 1918. The German spring offensives resulted in the extension of conscription in April 1918 to those aged up to 50, with provision to call up men to the age of 56 if the need arose, and also to extend conscription to Ireland.
In theory, conscription should have equalised the burden after 1916 but as elsewhere conscription was selective. There were always going to be men exempted by virtue of physical fitness, occupation, or even nationality. Medical boards exempted over a million men in the last twelve months of the war despite pressure on doctors to lower rejection rates. Of the 2,4 million men medically examined in 1917 and 1918, only 36 per cent were physically fit for service overseas. Rejection rates reflected pre-war deprivation but, in part, there was also an application of suspect criteria as to what constituted fitness: physical ability was too readily equated with stature. There was also social prejudice with Jews and, especially, Russian Jews automatically rejected as inferior. The military service tribunals that pronounced on claims for exemption have been perceived to be unduly influenced by military demands, and hostile to claims for exemption on conscientious grounds. It is clear, however, that they were ever mindful of local economic vitality, not least in rural areas, consciously mitigating national policy directives, and indulging in their own interpretation of economic interventionism.
Whatever the reasons for enlistment, the effect of what occurred in August and September 1914 was that certain groups were more willing to enlist than others. Seen from the perspective of sectoral distribution of occupation, some in Britain bore a proportionally high share of the military effort. By February 1916, Board of Trade sampling surveys, though not entirely reliable, suggested that whereas over 40 per cent of those engaged